Investigative Article

Issue Statement

Since the fall of the Republic of Afghanistan in August 2021, a coordinated denial campaign has intensified on the Afshar tragedy that occurred in the 1990s, driven by individuals and media outlets affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami and its military-political wing, the Supervisory Council (Shura-e Nazar).

The objective is to deny, minimize, or rewrite the documented atrocities committed in Afshar. In the lead-up to the annual commemoration of 10–11 February 1993 (21–22 Dalw 1371 solar Hijri), a Tehran-based outlet tied to one Jamiat faction has published a series of articles recasting the events as “a routine inter-factional clash.” These pieces go further, accusing the Hazara community- the primary victims and survivors-of fabricating an “industry of victimhood.”

Parallel efforts appear on platforms such as the YouTube channel of Razzaq Mamoon and the Facebook accounts of prominent Tajik cultural figures, including Akram Andishmand, Hafiz Mansour, Azizullah Aryanfar, and Abdul Hai Khorasani, who held positions in the cultural and propaganda apparatus under the Rabbani government. These narratives routinely dismiss mass killings, systematic sexual violence, and widespread human rights abuses as mere “clashes between two armed groups,” imply that victims “deserved” their fate due to affiliation with Hezb-e Wahdat Islami, and falsely claim that those killed were primarily Sayyids and Qizilbash rather than Hazaras.

Such propaganda seeks to normalize one of the darkest episodes of Afghanistan’s civil war, an episode that multiple independent international investigations have classified as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Reports by Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Afghanistan Justice Project (AJP), research by the Newlines Institute, and Resolution 501 of the American Bar Association (ABA) rest on eyewitness testimony, field documentation, and forensic patterns that categorically refute these partisan distortions.

This article does not merely recount the events. It dissects the denial campaign itself, analyzes the political and ideological motives behind it, and, drawing directly from the cited primary sources, establishes that the Afshar operation was a premeditated military campaign involving large-scale, systematic crimes for which named commanders bear clear responsibility under international law.

The article’s purpose is to safeguard Afghanistan’s collective historical memory against attempts, rooted in ethnic partisanship and party loyalty, to erase these crimes from public consciousness; crimes that should serve as a permanent moral and legal lesson for past and present Afghan leaders. It further insists that the country’s political and intellectual elites must adopt a consistent, rights-based standard when addressing historical atrocities and human rights violations, abandoning selective amnesia and double standards.

Afshar: A Neighborhood with Deep-Rooted Hazara and Shia Identity

Afshar originated in 1738 (1117 solar Hijri) during Nader Shah Afshar’s campaign, when he established a fortress and residential complex in the area’s temperate, fertile terrain. Over subsequent decades, Hazara families migrated from central and northern Hazarajat and settled alongside the original inhabitants, maintaining peaceful relations.

The neighborhood’s pronounced Shia identity made it a target during Amir Abdul Rahman Khan’s late-19th-century campaigns against the Hazaras. Social and religious leaders were executed on charges of Shiism, the main fortress was confiscated, and roughly 70 percent of the population was expelled or fled. The area later recovered, and by the 1990s, Afshar had again become a densely populated district where Hazaras Community formed approximately 70 percent of the residents. This demographic and symbolic significance turned the neighborhood into a strategic focal point during the factional fighting that erupted after the 1992 collapse of the Najibullah regime.

Context and Triggers of the 1993 Events

Following the fall of Dr. Najibullah Ahmadzai’s government in April 1992 and the signing of the Peshawar Accord, a transitional power-sharing framework was established among Pakistan-based Mujahideen parties. The accord stipulated a six-month interim period: two months under Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, followed by four months under Burhanuddin Rabbani, after which nationwide elections were to be prepared. The agreement explicitly stated that these periods “will not be extended even by a day.”

When Rabbani’s term was extended beyond the agreed limit through the traditional mechanism known as the Council of Resolution and Binding (Ahl al-Hall wa al-Aqd) a body of notables and leaders authorized under classical Islamic political theory to elect, confirm, or remove a ruler, several parties, including Hezb-e Wahdat Islami, denounced the move as a fundamental breach. Investigative analyses, including the AJP report, identify this violation as one of the primary catalysts for the ensuing bloodshed in Kabul.

The conflict was never purely ideological. It centered on control of Kabul’s districts, competition for state power, and competing visions of governance. Hezb-e Wahdat Islami, led by Abdul Ali Mazari and representing the majority Hazara-Shia population, advocated a decentralized, inclusive state with recognition of Ja’fari jurisprudence. Rabbani’s administration viewed Wahdat’s growing influence in western Kabul, including its headquarters at the Academy of Social Sciences, only a few kilometers from Afshar, as an existential threat.

Command Structure and Planning

According to both the AJP and HRW reports, the Afshar military operation was a meticulously planned military offensive under the overall command of Ahmad Shah Masoud, then Defense Minister of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Strategic objectives included seizing Wahdat’s headquarters, neutralizing Mazari’s forces, and consolidating control over western Kabul by empowering allied Shia factions (notably the Akbari splinter of Wahdat and Hezb-e Harakat under Sheikh Mohammad Asif Mohseni).

Key planning meetings were held at Badambagh military base (9 February 1993, chaired by Masoud with senior Jamiat and Ittihad commanders) and at Masoud’s Karte Parwan headquarters the night before the assault. Primary forces comprised units of the Supervisory Council/Jamiat-e Islami (under Masoud) and Ittihad-e Islami (under Abdul Rasul Sayyaf). HRW and AJP explicitly attribute command responsibility to Masoud and Sayyaf for both the operation and the subsequent failure to prevent or punish atrocities committed by their subordinates.

The Assault: Indiscriminate Bombardment to House-to-House Atrocities

Heavy rocket and artillery bombardment of Afshar’s civilian neighborhoods began on 10 February 1993 and intensified through 11 February. On the morning of 11 February, ground forces advanced from multiple directions. Once Wahdat’s defensive positions were overrun, the operation degenerated into systematic house-to-house searches and reprisals.

HRW’s Blood-Stained Hands and the AJP’s Casting Shadows describe the events as far exceeding legitimate military action. After the initial shelling, which killed hundreds of civilians in their homes or while fleeing, forces under Masoud and Sayyaf conducted mass killings, summary executions, systematic rape, torture, mutilation of bodies, widespread looting, arson, and abductions. Hazara men and boys were routinely separated on ethnic and sectarian grounds and executed. Estimates, drawn from eyewitness accounts and local documentation, indicate hundreds killed outright, with approximately 700–750 men and boys arrested and disappeared (presumed killed), and dozens of women and girls subjected to sexual violence. Thousands were displaced.

Survivor testimonies compiled by HRW paint a consistent, harrowing picture of deliberate civilian targeting:

• One resident (pseudonym R.J.G.) described fleeing toward the Intercontinental Hotel: “The street was full of people escaping from Afshar… Masoud’s forces were shooting at them… Seventeen people were killed—seventeen bodies were lying in the street… Clearly, they were civilians. Yes, it was clear: they had burqas, there were children.” Upon returning to a house, “When we went inside, we found only one skull and four large bones on the floor.”
• Another survivor (pseudonym Y.B.K.), a teenager detained by Ittihad forces, recounted: “Along the road I saw fifty or sixty corpses… Some were shot. Some were cut up, limbs severed… There was a lot of blood on the ground… The troops were making [people] drag precious things with them, like they were porters… What they couldn’t take, they broke into pieces—for instance, the refrigerators.”
• Identity-based targeting was explicit. An Ittihad commander (identified in HRW as Shir Agha Zarshakh) told a resident: “Hey Hazara, this is your graveyard. Where are you going?” When the man protested he was a civilian, the commander replied: “Whether you are a civilian or not, you are a Hazara.” The man and his seven-year-old son were then beaten.

Legal Classification and Command Responsibility

These acts, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, summary executions, torture, rape, and enforced disappearances, constitute grave breaches of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity. Both HRW and AJP conclude that the operation was premeditated, coordinated at the highest levels, and executed under identifiable command structures. Masoud and Sayyaf, as de facto operational leaders, bear command responsibility not only for ordering the assault but for failing to prevent or punish the ensuing atrocities despite clear awareness. The events fit squarely within the broader pattern of persecution against Hazaras documented by the Newlines Institute and cited in the ABA’s 2024 Resolution 501 condemning the genocide of the Hazara people.

United Nations documentation and subsequent analyses reject claims that the crimes were rogue or spontaneous. The eventual partial withdrawal, prompted by international pressure, does not absolve those in command.

The Imperative of Accountability

For three decades, domestic accountability has been blocked by a culture of impunity. Senior Jamiat Islamic and Supervisory Council figures who held power in the Islamic State government and recently in the Republic regime (2001-2021) have evaded responsibility. Some affiliated intellectuals have actively promoted denial. The Rabbani administration itself established a fact-finding commission after the massacre to assess damages and arrange compensation, but the records were destroyed by the Taliban in 1996.

In recent years, limited admissions have surfaced. An Ittihad-e-e Islamic commander, Qomandan Ahmadi, a participant in the operation, has corroborated many of the crimes documented internationally. Sediq Chakari, then Deputy Leader of Jamiat-e Islami and Minister of Information and Culture, publicly stated that he witnessed the killing of Hazara civilians and the burning of their homes, apologized to God and the people of Afshar, and called on others involved to do the same.

Internationally, the UN Human Rights Council’s 2024 decision to create an independent investigative mechanism for Afghanistan, supported by over 100 human rights organizations, offers the most credible prospect in decades for preserving evidence and pursuing justice for Afshar and similar crimes.

Conclusion

The Afshar massacre was never a “routine factional clash.” It was a planned military operation that degenerated into organized violence exhibiting all the hallmarks of war crimes and crimes against humanity: deliberate targeting of civilians on ethnic and religious grounds, systematic sexual violence, and mass disappearance. Authoritative documentation from HRW, AJP, and others leaves no room for equivocation.

The current denial campaign is not harmless revisionism. It assaults the historical record, disrespects victims’ dignity, and erects barriers to national reconciliation and genuine peace. Sustained resistance to these efforts and an unwavering commitment to truth are essential to healing Afghanistan’s deepest wounds and preventing repetition.

The Hazara community’s demand for justice is not “victimhood politics.” It is a fundamental claim to equal citizenship and recognition of suffering endured across generations, particularly under the Mujahideen-era governments. For the international community, supporting this demand means upholding the rules-based order, strengthening investigative mechanisms, and affirming that lasting peace in Afghanistan cannot be built on evasion or organized denial of crimes that shock the conscience of humanity.

Sources

1. Afshar, Position and History – Mohsen Sharifi, Hazarapaedia
2. Afshar, War – Mohammad Hossein Hasrat, Hazarapaedia
3. Blood-Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan’s Legacy of Impunity, Human Rights Watch, 2005
4. Casting Shadows: War Crimes in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Justice Project, 2005
5. The Hazaras: An Overlooked Humanitarian Crisis, Newlines Institute
6. American Bar Association Resolution 501 (2024)
7. Peshawar Accord, 24 April 1992

Video testimonies: [1] Commander Ahmadi confirmation [2] Sediq Chakari interview

Note on terminology: Council of Resolution and Binding (Ahl al-Hall wa al-Aqd) refers to the traditional Islamic consultative body of notables empowered to resolve major leadership questions, invoked in this instance to extend President Rabbani’s term beyond the Peshawar Accord limits.