Afghanistan Five Years On: Discrimination, Exclusion and the Hazara Question

Afghanistan is approaching the fifth anniversary of the fall of the Republic and the Taliban’s return to power. For many Afghans, 15 August 2021 was not merely a change of government. It marked the collapse of a political system, the loss of many achievements of the previous two decades, and the beginning of a new period whose political, social and human-rights consequences continue to shape the country.

Many questions surrounding the collapse of the Republic System remain contested or unanswered. The Doha Agreement, the exclusion of the Afghan government from the main negotiations, the United States’ decision to withdraw its forces, structural weaknesses and corruption within the Republic, and the concentration of political power in the Arg (Presidential Palace) all contributed to the collapse. Reports by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), as well as analyses by scholars such as William Maley and Ahmad Shuja, have examined these and other factors.

The purpose of this article, however, is not to debate and assess why the Republic collapsed. The more pressing question is: Five years later, in what direction is Afghanistan heading?

Recent developments make this question particularly urgent. Is the Taliban’s treatment of land and property rights, religious identity and freedom, and the physical security of Hazaras and followers of Shia Islam a collection of separate and unrelated incidents? Or do these developments point to a broader pattern of discrimination, pressure and targeted treatment?

To explore this question, the following sections examine several specific developments- from land disputes and displacement to restrictions on religious practices, security threats and reported extrajudicial killings.

The purpose is to consider what these cases reveal about governance under the Taliban and, more importantly, what the continuation of such practices could mean for Hazaras and Shias in particular, and for social cohesion, stability and Afghanistan’s future more broadly.

I. Signs of Systematic Discrimination and Pressure

1. Repression Extends Beyond One Community

Repression under the Taliban is not limited to Hazaras. Women and girls have been barred from secondary education and universities and subjected to extensive restrictions on employment, movement and participation in public life. Journalists, civil-society activists and critics face arrest, threats and mistreatment. Freedom of expression and independent political activity have been severely restricted, while an independent judicial system capable of effectively checking state power no longer exists.

UNAMA has repeatedly documented arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killings, mistreatment and corporal punishment. Its periodic human-rights reporting continues to demonstrate the seriousness of the broader human-rights situation in Afghanistan.

Yet the widespread nature of repression does not mean that every community experiences it in the same way. Hazaras and Shias face additional and intersecting concerns, including land disputes and displacement, restrictions on religious practices, ethnic and religious discrimination, and continuing targeted attacks by Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has similarly described religious-freedom conditions in Afghanistan as extremely serious, noting that the Taliban’s enforcement of their interpretation of Sunni Islam has placed religious minorities, including Shias, under particular pressure.

2. Land Disputes: Where Identity and Property Rights Intersect

One important example is the dispute over land in Nawabad of Ghazni. The area is predominantly Hazara, and thousands of families have built homes and lived there over many years. Taliban authorities have reportedly declared a substantial portion of the land—approximately 1,843 jeribs—state-owned or usurped. Residents maintain that they possess documents demonstrating legal purchase and occupation and have demanded a fair review.

Their question was fundamental: if settlements built on disputed land across Afghanistan are to be reviewed according to a particular legal standard, is that standard being applied consistently to everyone? The response they received was alarming. The head of Ghazni’s Special Court for the Restitution of Usurped Lands reportedly told them: “This township is a special case for us. You must evacuate, or we will demolish it and forcibly expel you.”

The state has a legitimate responsibility to investigate claims involving public or usurped land proving that the state is legitimate. Ethnicity alone cannot establish legal ownership. But the opposite principle is equally important: a government should not deprive thousands of families of property through administrative decisions without transparent procedures, independent review and a meaningful right of appeal.

The case of Omid-e-Sabz Township in western Kabul raises similar concerns. Property owners maintain that they purchased their land, possess title deeds and other documentation, and built through official procedures. If the authorities consider those documents invalid, that determination should be established through a credible, transparent and independent process, with the evidence forming the basis of the decision made available for scrutiny.

This points to a deeper structural problem. The authorities claiming that land belongs to the state, those assessing the validity of ownership documents, and those making the final determination all operate within the same political system. Without independent judicial oversight, citizens have limited means of challenging decisions made against them.

The issue therefore extends beyond Nawabad or Omid-e-Sabz. It concerns the broader security of private property in Afghanistan. If title deeds, purchase records, official permits and years of investment and settlement cannot guarantee access to an independent legal review, the security of property rights becomes uncertain for everyone.

3. Displacement and Forced Relocation

Concerns surrounding Hazara land rights are not confined to Ghazni and Kabul. Human Rights Watch reported that on 27 July 2025 Taliban authorities forcibly expelled 25 Hazara families—approximately 200 people, including women, children and elderly residents—from Rashak village in Bamyan. Since the Taliban’s return to power, other reports have described land disputes and displacement affecting Hazara communities in parts of Daikundi, Ghazni, Mazare Sharif and elsewhere.

Not every land dispute involving Hazara communities necessarily has an ethnic motive, and it would be inaccurate to describe every such case as forced ethnic displacement without sufficient evidence. However, when similar cases repeatedly occur in areas inhabited predominantly by a particular community, examining the broader pattern becomes both legitimate and necessary.

Several questions are therefore important: Who is losing land? Who benefits from the decisions? Which institutions make those decisions? Are comparable standards applied elsewhere? And do affected citizens have meaningful access to appeal and independent justice?

Answers to these questions are essential in determining whether particular cases are ordinary legal disputes or evidence of a broader discriminatory pattern.

4. Religious Restrictions and Pressure

The situation of Hazaras cannot be understood solely through ethnicity. A large majority of Hazaras follow Shia Islam, meaning ethnic and religious identity frequently intersect.

Human Rights Watch has reported restrictions affecting Shia religious activities, including the banning of certain Shia religious books and a gathering in Bamiyan in September 2025. Other reports have described restrictions involving Shia religious institutions and scholars, including the summoning, warning or mistreatment of religious figures in Kabul.

Concerns about religious freedom extend beyond Twelver Shias. Reports have also documented pressure affecting Ismailis in Badakhshan and other religious minorities. USCIRF has emphasized the broader consequences of the Taliban imposing their interpretation of Islam across Afghan society. For a Hazara Shia citizen, therefore, ethnic and religious identity may overlap in ways that increase vulnerability.

5. Hazaras and a Distinct Security Threat

Hazaras and Shias also continue to face a persistent security threat from ISKP. Since Taliban return to power, Hazara mosques, educational institutions and civilian gatherings have repeatedly been targeted in attacks claimed by the group.

This creates an important contradiction in the Taliban’s claim to have restored security. Nationwide armed conflict has decreased considerably compared with the period before August 2021. Yet for a community repeatedly targeted because of its religious or ethnic identity, security cannot simply mean the absence of large-scale war. Security must also mean being able to attend school, enter a place of worship, travel and participate in public life without fearing attack because of one’s identity.

6. Extrajudicial Killings and the Absence of Accountability

Reports have also emerged in recent weeks and months of individuals suspected of crimes, including theft, being killed by Taliban forces. Among the most serious recent allegations are reports concerning the deaths of young Hazaras in Kabul who were subsequently accused of involvement in theft.

The precise circumstances of these incidents require credible and independent investigation. Afghanistan’s highly restricted media environment also requires caution regarding initial reports, figures and competing claims. The underlying legal principle, however, is straightforward: an accusation is not proof of guilt.

A suspect must be arrested according to law, evidence must be gathered, the accused must have an opportunity to defend themselves, and an impartial and competent court must determine guilt or innocence. When an armed authority can kill an individual and subsequently justify the killing by alleging criminal activity, the distinction between law enforcement and arbitrary force becomes dangerously blurred.

A gun cannot replace a court:

This points again to the larger problem of governance without effective accountability. Afghanistan has no elected parliament, national elections are not held, political parties cannot function freely, civil society has been severely restricted, and independent media operate under intense pressure. Nor is there an independent judicial system capable of effectively protecting citizens against abuses of state power.

These conditions affect all Afghans. But their consequences are particularly serious for ethnic and religious minorities that already face additional vulnerabilities.

II. Is There a Pattern of Structural Discrimination?

A distinction must be maintained between political and social analysis and legal determination: Establishing that particular policies or actions legally constitute ethnic persecution, forced displacement or international crimes requires comprehensive evidence and independent investigation by competent national or international human rights bodies.

At the level of a general human-rights and political analysis, however, several developments cannot simply be considered in isolation: Repeated land disputes in Hazara-inhabited areas; documented cases of forced displacement; restrictions affecting Twelver Shias and Ismailis; the absence of independent judicial remedies; continuing ISKP attacks against Hazaras and Shias; and a political structure in which meaningful mechanisms of accountability and oversight have largely disappeared.

Taken together, these developments do not by themselves settle the legal question of whether a specific international crime has occurred. They do, however, justify closer monitoring, systematic documentation and greater attention from Afghan and international human-rights institutions.

They also raise an important question for the Hazara community itself: can silence, accommodation or reliance on personal relationships with Taliban officials provide sustainable protection? Afghanistan’s history suggests that collective rights cannot be secured through personal relationships or short-term arrangements alone. Sustainable protection requires credible legal guarantees, functioning institutions and mechanisms through which citizens can defend their rights.

Rather than relying on scattered or primarily emotional reactions to individual incidents, Hazara civil society and advocacy networks outside Afghanistan need systematic documentation, legal expertise, sustained advocacy on property and religious rights, and a credible evidence-based narrative. Furthermore, exaggeration can weaken advocacy just as silence can. Effective advocacy must rest on evidence, documentation, law and the voices of those directly affected.

III. Why This Matters for All Afghans?

The demand for justice cannot be reduced to a Hazara issue. If a Hazara family can lose its home or land without a fair legal process, the principle of property right is weakened for every Afghan. If a Shia citizen cannot freely practise their religion, religious freedom itself is weakened. If a person accused of a crime can be killed without trial and without accountability process, the rights to life and due process are placed at risk for everyone.

When discrimination against one community becomes normalized, applying the same logic to another becomes easier. Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Baloch, Aimaqs, Nuristanis, Pashais and Afghanistan’s other communities therefore share a fundamental interest in defending equality before the law.

The Taliban may be able to use military and administrative power to suppress protests or impose decisions despite public opposition. But coercion can alter outward behavior; it cannot erase collective memory.

A family that loses its home and property after decades of work does not simply forget the experience. A community that believes it has been treated differently because of ethnicity or religion carries that grievance forward.

Discriminatory policies are therefore not only a human-rights concern of the present. They are also a question of Afghanistan’s future peace and coexistence. Unaddressed injustice produces collective grievance; grievance deepens distrust; and profound distrust in a heavily armed society with a long history of conflict can once again create conditions for violence.

Afghanistan has already paid the price of this cycle for more than four decades.

IV.  Five Years On: What Kind of Afghanistan Is Emerging?

Five years after 15 August 2021, the central question is no longer whether the Taliban can maintain control. They clearly exercise military and administrative authority over the country.

The more consequential question is: what kind of political and social order is being created under that authority?

A country in which women are largely excluded from public life, political critics cannot operate freely, religious minorities feel insecure, property disputes cannot be reviewed by an independent judiciary, and effective institutions for holding rulers accountable are absent may achieve political control. But control should not be confused with sustainable stability.

For Afghanistan to escape its recurring cycle of exclusion and violence, several principles must be treated as non-negotiable: no ethnic community should be punished because of its identity; no person should face repression because of religion or belief; no accused person should be punished without due process; and no family should lose its home or land without transparent, lawful and fair procedures.

Defending these principles is not the defence of one ethnic group against another. It is the defence of Afghanistan itself. National solidarity acquires meaning when citizens defend the rights of people beyond their own ethnic, religious or regional community. Afghanistan’s shared future will not be secured through silence in the face of injustice, but through institutions and principles that protect every citizen equally.

Related Sources

1. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Why the Afghan Government Collapsed?
2. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Update on the Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan, April to June 2026
3. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026: Afghanistan
4. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), Religious Freedom Conditions in Afghanistan
5. UNAMA, Human Rights Monitoring and Reporting, Afghanistan